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FRINGES ARD TRANSITIVE STATES 
IN WILLIAM JAMBS* CONCEPT OF TUE STREAM OF THOUGHT 
Stephen II. Daniel 
I. Introduction 
In William James' discussion of the sensible continu-
ity of thought in personal consciousness, he proposes that 
through introspection we can determine certain aspects of 
thought which, as it were, "unite" various "substantial" 
elements of thought into a continuous "stream". For, even 
though the objects which come into consciousness may vary 
or chaise with startling abruptness, the flow of thought 
itself (or the experiencing of these changes) feels con-
tinuous. Such continuity of thought implies, for James, 
that successive objects of consciousness (or "fields" of 
awareness) dissolve or fade into one another gradually. 
And this means that successive fields of awareness must 
share certain characteristics which allow for such conti-
nuity and smoothness of transition. Therefore within the 
stream of consciousness, we can detect a certain stability 
in those objects of thought which can be held before the 
mind for a period of time and a certain transitivity in 
those objects of thought which lead from one "substantial" 
part to another. 
However, in order to speak about these shared charac-
teristics which are common to successive fields of con-
sciousness, James has to "take a slice" of the stream and 
make it "stand still", in order to compare one slice (or 
one "act" of consciousness) to a successive one. This 
changing of perspective from the stream to individual con-
scious acts has a number of ramifications as far as his 
vocabulary is concerned: for example, when his concentra-
tion shifts from the stream to one relatively-fixed object 
of consciousness within the stream, the terms implying 
movement like "flows", "stream", and "dissolving views" 
are replaced by more static words like "field", "part", 
"state", and "margin". And if we could just keep the two 
areas of concentration separate by the use of terms like 
these, then there would be little problem in understanding 
what area of concentration James is referring to when he 
uses these terms. Dut his purpose is not to give two ex-
planations of how we can understand the continuity of 
thought; rather, it is to clarify how we can speak of a 
"stream" of thought by investigating parts within the 
stream. 
Therefore, if we concentrate upon a particular act of 
consciousness, distinguishing within that act certain tran 
sitive elements (i.e., elements which include the "echoing 
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of preceding acts and the anticipations of acts "about to 
be"}, then we should be able to relate such transitive ele-
ments back to the stream of thought from which the act of 
consciousness as a whole is a slice. After all, we need 
to attribute to a particular act of consciousness all of 
the characteristics which such an act has in the stream 
before we can legitimately extract it from the stream in 
order to treat it as an "act of consciousness". 
By an "act of consciousness" or "an act of awareness" 
I mean to include the whole act as encompassing the sub-
stantive and transitive parts, though in any such act we 
are directly conscious of only the focal or substantive 
part of the act, and indirectly aware of the transitive 
parts. The particularization of any "act of conscious-
ness" is, of course, determined by and named according to 
t n e object of consciousness. And though the object of 
consciousness is itself a product of selective attention 
(and therefore is, in a way, an abstraction), we should „ 
not think that the "act" or "state" of consciousness upon 
which we focus in the discussion of fringes and transi-
tive states is not also the product of selective attention. 
We delineate a particular act of consciousness in order to 
discuss the stream of consciousness just as wc selectively 
attend to some elements in experience and not others.1 
In the chapter on the "stream of thought" in the 
Principles of Psychology, and particularly in the section 
of the chapter dealing with the continuity of thought, 
James occasionally shifts his emphasis from the consid-
eration of what constitutes an act of consciousness to a 
condideration of how that act fits into the stream of 
thought. The transitive parts of the content of an act 
of consciousness are recognized most explicitly when the 
thought is seen as appearing in the stream; but extracted 
from the stream, the thought appears to have other char-
acteristics "on its fringes"--characteristics that may or 
may not become focal or consciously recognized in future 
acts of awareness. 
In short, we will misinterpret vhac James says about 
"fringes" if we simply think of them as the static counter-
parts of the transitive states of the stream of thought. 
This, apparently, is what Bruce Wilshirc does when he 
writes that a fringe is "a transitive state mirroring 
temporal relations."* For, as I hope to show, fringes arc 
not transitive states, nor are they limited to temporal 
relations alone. The fringe of an act of consciousness 
is port of the act of consciousness, i.e., that part which 
includes the dimly-known relations and objects connected 
to or related to the focus (or substant ivc part) of the 
"object cognized". [Note: Even though it is possible to 
speak about the objects of consciousness as having 
"fringes"--and J n ines occasionally docs so--the point that 1 
am highlighting here is that the act of consciousness it-
self has fringes which are included by James within the 
act (even in the process of the abstraction of the act 
from the stream of consciousness).] 
When these dimly-known relations arc recognized as 
involving actual relations to previous or subsequent ele-
ments in the stream of thought, they become the transitive 
parts of the act of consciousness. The chief concern of 
this article will he to show how I have arrived at this 
understanding of James 1 use of "fringe", and how "fringes" 
relate to what James calls the "transitive states" of the 
acts of consciousness. I have generally limited my re-
marks to James 1 discussion of conscious activity and the 
brain processes which he feels limit, to a certain extent, 
the speed and duration of acts of conscious activity. 
II• Parts of Acts of Consciousness and the Stream of 
Thought 
James begins the study of an act of consciousness by 
looking at it as it appears in the stream of thought. In 
the stream, such acts are integrally bound up with and, 
to an extent, defined by other acts in the stream. For 
no act of consciousness is totally disconnected from those 
acts which precede and succeed it. The consciousness of 
the sound of thunder is not cognized apart from the con-
sciousness of its breaking-in-upon-the-silcncc which 
preceded it or apart from the thunder's setting up an 
echoing condition for that moment which follows, hut 
we characterize and name acts of consciousness (e.g., 
the consciousness of the sound of thunder) by those 
things, objects, or images which "can be held before the * 
mind for an indefinite time."3 These "substantive parts" 
of the strear* allow us to speak about one act of con-
sciousness as distinguished from another net of con-
sciousness. 
However, a basic principle of the stream of thought 
idea is that such distinction of substantive parts docs 
not indicate a distinction between nets of consciousness. 
In other words, each act may be characterized or named by 
the substantive pnrt of the act, but this does not mean 
that the substantive part is the totality of the act. 
For the totality of the act includes the relations which 
the substantive part has with the substantive parts of 
previous or subsequent acts. Those relations, which 
arc internal to the act, constitute the transitive parts 
of an net of consciousness: they arc the parts which 
unite the substantive parts of thought so as to account 
for Its stream-like character. 
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The transitive parts of successive acts of conscious-
ness overlap one another so as to make the distinction of 
acts meaningful only in terms of the substantive or 
"focal" point of each act. For example, in comparing an 
act of awareness in which silence is the focal point to 
the act of awareness which follows it in which thunder 
is the focal point, we notice "in between" the awareness 
of the contrast of the thunder-breaking-in-upon-thc-
silcnce" And. in a way, we would not bo altogether wrong 
in recognizing such a contrast itself as a possible sub-
stantive partof the stream of thought. That is ? wc can 
extract from the stream acts of consciousness which have 
for their focal points either objects or objects in re-
lation to one another. Indeed, on a superficial reeding 
of James, one might think that relations of objects would 
apply only to the transitive parts of an act of thought. 
For he speaks about the transitive parts as "filled with 
the thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for 
the most part obtain between the matters contemplated in 
the periods of comparative rest,"4 i.e., in the substan-
tive parts. 
But James does not rule out the possibility of our 
considering a relation itself as a substantive part, as 
a "matter contemplated in the periods of comparative 
rest." At one point he remarks that "space relations, 
relations of contrast, etc. are felt along with their 
terms in substantive states as well as in transitive 
states."S Not only arc the terms or objects substantive, 
but the relations between them might also be included in 
the substantive part of a larger, more inclusive act of 
consciousness. Thus, our awareness of thunder-breaking-
in-upon-the-silcnce might be itself considered the sub-
stantive part of some act of consciousness whose transi-
tive parts include the relation of the a'./arctiess of 
thunder-breaking-in-upon-silencc to previous and subse-
quent focal points of awareness. These might include, 
for example, the act of consciousness where thunder is 
the focal point or one where silence is the focal point. 
What I am indicating is that using James' method 
of speaking about consciousness as a stream and his 
method of extracting acts of consciousness from the stream 
in order to distinguish between their substantive and 
transitive parts, wc arc led to conclude that between the 
act of awareness of the silence and the act of awareness 
of the thunder, we could extract numerous acts of aware-
ness in which the contrast of the silence and the thunder 
would be the substantive or focal point of the act. Wc 
could then understand the stream of thought as a con-
tinuous stream of focal points, with the transitive 
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states of each act of consciousness gaining meaning only 
in reference to one or another focal point* That is, if 
we pinpoint the focus of a particular act of awareness, 
we indirectly specify the transitive parts of the act 
at the same time* But each point along the stream can 
be designated the focal or substantive part of some act, 
because the substantive part can involve relations. Or, 
to put it bluntly, the stream of thought can be under-
stood as a continual conscious awareness of focal or sub* 
stantive parts which are recognized as comprising the 
relations of objects to one another; and the transitive 
parts associated with such a relational substantive part 
would involve relations of this focal relation to other 
substantive parts of the stream. 
As Hans I.inschoten points out, this tends to dis-
solve the distinction between substantive and transitive 
parts of conscious acts, for the substantive parts 
(determined by what we choose to use as a focal point 
by which to name the entire act) can themselves involve 
relations: "We must not look upon that substantivlty 
and transitivity as upon actual classes; they are rather 
qualities that differ in degree."6 As we attempt to 
compact more and more objects into relations which con* 
stitute the focal point of our act of consciousness, 
however, we reach a point where the structuring begins 
to break down. At that point we can no longer hold 
objects and their relations in the well-defined and 
relatively stable arrangement characteristic of a sub-
stantive state. The relatedncss of objects begins to 
"spill over" the limits of the substantive part. Such 
overflowing is characteristic of transitive parts of con* 
sciousness and foclings of tendency (or "fringes"). 
III. Substantive and Transitive States 
Preceding and subsequent acts of consciousness, of 
course, are determined as "preceding" and "subsequent" by 
means of the prrscnt act. If we choose any different 
point of the stream upon which to focus, i.e., if we choose 
any different substantive part by which to name the whole 
act of consciousness, we will likewise have to re-define 
what constitutes the "preceding" and "subsequent" acts. 
We should, therefore, realize that the transitive states 
of successive a t ts overlap with one another. In fact, 
viewed objectively, the substautIvo states of successive 
acts overlap, though only the substantive state of the 
present act is recognized subjectively as being the focus 
of the act. In other words, when tho psychologist 
compares successive acts, he recognizes that each has a 
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substantive or focal part. But what is focal for one 
may easily become a transitive part of another or an 
aspect of a substantivo part of another. In one act of 
consciousnessi the substantive part may consist of an 
awareness of silence; in the next act, the substantive 
part may be the awareness of thunder-breaking-in-upon-
silence; in the third, the substantive part may be the 
awareness of thunder alone. In the first act of con-
sciousness, the awareness of thunder is only vaguely 
known in the transitive part of that act as something 
which is a characteristic of the substantive part of 
the second and subsequent act of consciousness. The 
focal point of the second act contrasts the substantive 
parts of the first and third acts; at the same time, 
the transitive parts of the second act include the 
cognition of the first act as a fading echo of a pre-
vious act of consciousness, and include the cognition of 
the third act as an emergent anticipation of a subse-
quent act of consciousness. 
As it might seem from all this, the temporal rela-
tions of acts of consciousness to one another are going 
to present a number of perplexing situations for this 
type of interpretation. For example, thunder-hreaking-
in-upon-silcncc might be the substantive part of an act 
of consciousness. Now this substantive part includes the 
awareness of the temporal progression which is involved 
in thunder breaking in upon silence. However, the pre-
ceding and subsequent transitive parts (or, as James 
calls them, the "backward-looking*' and "forward-looking" 
transitive parts) refer to acts of consciousness which 
are temporally distinguished from the substantive part 
of the act. The "echoes" of previous acts and the antic-
ipation of subsequent acts are included in the totality 
of the whole present act of consciousness through the 
transitive parts of the present act. And this is pos-
sible only because James understands the present not as 
some "point" along a line but as an indefinite temporal 
duration, a "specious" present, or an indefinitely de-
termined "segment" of time. 
Thus, the recent past might still be echoing in the 
specious present as a transitive part of the present act 
of consciousness. Or, to put this in terms of the phys-
iological aspect of conscious activity, "there is at 
every moment a culmination of brain-processes overlapping 
each other, of which the fainter ones arc dying phases of 
processes which but shortly previous wore active in a 
maximal degree."7 The dying phases constitute the 
"rearward-looking" transitive part of the present act, 
while the emergent phases constitute the "forward-looking" 
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transitive part of the present act. Transitive parts, 
then, are not to be considered "outside" of the specious 
proscnt; they are recognized as transitive because they 
are the cognizod relations of the substantive part to 
previous and subsequent substantive parts of other acts 
of awareness: as James writes, the transitive parts of 
our stream of thought "cognize the relations rather than 
the things."B 
Note, howcier, that the things related in transitive 
states arc always known or "cognized" as actually fading 
out of or emerging into the present act of awareness. 
That is, transitive parts of the stream deal with things 
which actually have been or will be substantive parts; 
there is no question, for example, that the transitive 
state is the cognition of simply a possible thing which 
might or might not becomo the substantive part of a suc-
ceeding act. An object which has been recognized in a 
previous act as that act's substantive part is cognized 
as actually related to the substantive part of the present 
act through the transitive parts of both acts. Prom the 
perspective of » previous substantive part, the present 
substantive part is cognized as future, while from the 
perspective of the present substantive part, the previous 
one is cognized as past. 
Since the transitive parts of the stream of thought 
deal with the relations of successive focal points (or 
"resting places"), the objects related in transitive 
states arc specified and "known" as definite objects. 
In tho case of the forward-looking transitive part of an 
act, we would have to say that the act as a whole in-
cludes knowledge of specific objects which are making 
their way toward the substantive part of OUT thought, but 
which have not as yet become substantive; therefore we do 
not consciously know them in their spocificity. 
I do not mean to confuse this with those experiences 
which we have in which we hod thought something would 
happen and then it did not. Such conscious awareness of 
the future would apply to the substantive part of our 
stream of thought, not to the transitive. The substan-
tive part might be the conscious expectation that some-
thing would come into our conscious experience shortly. 
However, the tiansitivc part of the same act of conscious-
ness might nt the same moment involve the cognition (of 
which we are not consciously aware) that something alto-
gether different from what we expect "consciously" or 
"substantively" is shortly going to appear to us con-
sciously, i.e., ns a substantive part of our stream of 
thought. We often refer to the unconscious present 
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awareness of future substantive parts of the stream as 
"vague" or "dim" in comparison to the present substantive 
part, when in reality, they are as distinct and precise 
as the present substantive part. But because they arc 
concerned with the relations of the substantive parts 
to one another, and not with the substantive parts 
themselves, wc think of them as being indefinite or 
undefined.9 
James takes this into account when he notes that 
transitive states are filled with thoughts of relation 
which are either "static" or "dynamic." A spatial 
relation, for example, could well exemplify a thought 
of a static relation. In our stream of thought we 
might concentrate first on the pupil of someone's 
eye, and then shift our concentration to the iris of 
the eye. The substantive part of the first act does 
not include the spatial relationship of the pupil 
to the iris, though the act's transitive part does 
include it. The iris is known specifically in its 
relation to the pupil in the transitive part as an 
object existing simultaneously with the pupil but 
not included with the pupil as the focus of the act. 
A temporal relation could exemplify a cognized 
dynamic relation which is transitive or non-focal. 
For example, wc might focus on a period of silence 
in one act of consciousness, and in a subsequent one 
focus on thunder. The transitive parts of the two 
acts indicate the occurrence of a temporal sequence: 
an awareness of silence is being broken into by an 
awareness of thunder. Both arc related to each 
other in the transitive parts of both acts, but the 
relations are such that the substantive part of 
the conscious awareness of thunder is recognized as 
temporally following the substantive part of the 
awareness of the silence, and the transitive part 
of the awareness of the silence includes the sub-
stantive part of the awareness of the thunder. 
IV. "Fringes" 
When James, then,begins to speak about the 
"fringes" of acts of consciousness, one might assume 
that he is referring to the transitive states of 
such acts--states which appear on the "fringe" of 
the substantive parts. Indeed, I have already 
described how we might refer to transitive parts 
as "vague" or "dim" as compared to substantive parts, 
and James uses words like these often to describe 
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what he win want to call the "fringes** or "fringe" 
of an act of consciousness. For example, he says, 
"Lot us use the words psychic overtone, suffusion, 
or fringe, to designate the influence of a taint 
brain-process upon our thought, as it makes it aware 
of relations and objects but dimly perceived."10 
It would appear that a transitive state of thought 
is what is meant by a "fringe." 
But this passage occurs several pages after 
James has indicated that he has finished speaking 
about transitive states and is turning his attention 
to "other unnamed states or qualities of states" 
which he generally refers to as "feelings of tendency." 
In fact, he refrains from speaking about "fringes" 
until he begins his discussion of these feelings 
of tendency, referring to transitive states up 
until that point by terms such as "thoughts of 
relation" or "feelings of relation." 
That James does not mean by "fringes" the same 
thing as transitive states appears most obvious in 
his discussion of the difference between "mere 
acquaintance" and "knowledge-about" as different 
states of thought. The difference between them, 
he notes, 
is reducible almost entirely to the absence 
or presence of psychic fringes or overtones. 
Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its 
relations. Acquaintance with it is limitation 
to the bare impression which it makes. Of 
most of its relations we are only aware in 
the penumbra1 nascent way of a 'fringe1 of 
unarticulated affinities about it*12 
We have seon already that transitive states 
in large measure cognize relatively specified objects 
as the terms of the relations of which the transitive 
parts are the cognitions. In fact, "knowledge about 
a thing as knowledge of its relations" seems to 
refer explicitly to transitive states. For transitive 
states always unite objects which have been or will 
be actually felt in relation to the substantive part 
of a present act. Furthermore, the distinguishing 
characteristic of a transitive state of one personal 
consciousness is that it does not mistake past or 
future substantive acts of other personal conscious-
nesses for its own: only those objects which are 
actually felt and determined to belong to this actual 
stream of thought are felt, thus insuring the continu-
ity of the personal stream. 
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States of "acquaintance" or "feelings of tendency" 
appear too vague and tenuous to provide for the firm con-
tinuity which characterizes the stream, but James will 
want to hold that they should not therefore be excluded 
from consideration as integral parts of the stream. 
Indeed, such "inarticulated affinities" of the substantive 
parts are propaedeutic to transitive states, sharing in 
the bringing about of transitive states by presenting a 
"fringe" of actualizable relations, Kach substantive part 
of an act of consciousness has a fringe of innumerable 
relations to, as yet, unrecognizable objects. When the 
objects are specified in their relation to the substantive 
part, the relations themselves are specified. That is, 
the relations become actualized or "cognized" in the act 
of consciousness: they become transitive parts of the 
stream. As James writes, "The fringe . . . is part of the 
object cogn i zed , - -subs tant ive Qualities and thinns appear-
ing to the mind in a fringe of relations. Some parts--the 
transitive parts--of our stream of thought cognize the re-
lations rather than the things."i^ We arc therefore to 
expect that each act of consciousness contains three dif-
ferent "kinds" of cognition: (1) the substantive part; 
(Z) the fringes of each aspect of the substantive part and 
the fringe or "halo" of the substantive part as a whole; 
and (3) the fringes whose objects are actually specified 
as previous or subsequent parts of the stream, i.e., those 
fringes which become transitive parts. 
livery object has about it a certain fringe of rela-
tions which simply "point beyond" the object without 
specifying it as having any particular meaning. It gains 
its meaning when it is put into a context, when it be-
comes "significant" in terms of the whole stream, or when 
certain vague affinities are "followed up" and specified 
in a transitive part of the stream. In short, the sub-
stantial object does not become thought until it is thought 
in a context of determined relations By the transitive 
parts.14 
In the case where the substantive part of an act of 
consciousness includes a number of words or objects, each 
word or object is "fringed" (i.e., indeterminately related 
to a number of dimly discerned items) before the whole act 
of consciousness is spocificd as having one complete, 
though perhaps complex, meaning. Uttering the sentence 
"Columbus discovered America in 1492" specifies a number 
of fringes of each word or thought (a) by putting them in 
the context of the whole "Object" or "theme" of the sentence 
(b) by giving each word meaning because of its grammatical 
form and use, and (c) by relating it temporally to the words 
of the sentence which come before and follow after it. 
"America," for example, gains meaning through the specifi-
cation of its transitive parts in being related to the whole 
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"thought" (or "Object") of Columbus' discovery of America 
in 1492, in acting as the direct object of the sentence, 
and in constituting a substantive part of the Object which 
is related through its transitive parts to the fading 
echoes of "Columbus" and "discovered" and to the anticipa-
tion of "in 1492". 
Suffuse all the words of a sentence, as they pass, 
with these three fringes or haloes of relotion, let 
the conclusion seem worth arriving at, and all will 
admit the sentence to be an expression of thoroughly 
continuous, unified, and rational thought. Iiach 
word, in such a sentence, is felt, not only as a 
word, but as having a meaning. The 'meaning' of a 
word taken thus dynamically in a sentence may be 
quite different from its meaning when takon statically 
or without context. . . . The object of every thought, 
then, is neither more nor less than all that the 
thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, 
however complicated the matter, and however symbolic 
the manner of the thinking may be.IS 
Fringes, therefore, accompany every act of thought 
and every substantive part of an act of thought. They 
point to "gaps" which are dimly perceived as the appro-
priate or inappropriate objects to which we feel the 
substantive parts should or should not be related in a 
certain way. But we cannot really "name" the gap nor 
the relation of the gap to the substantive part because 
the content of the gap is unknown--that is why it is a 
"gap"--and because the relation is unspecified until we 
have determined the nature of the gap, i.e., until we 
have determined the other "end" of the relation. When 
and if this occurs, the fringe is replaced by a transi-
tive state. Or, more precisely, the filling of tho gap 
specifics that one of the numerous possibilities opened 
in the "fringe of relations" has now been cognized as 
the terminus of a relation which constitutes n transitive 
part of the stream of thought. 
As each fringe of every substantial part of thought 
yields to some transitive part, numerous obscure rela-
tions which are not cognized in a transitive part go un-
realized and unnamed. For example, take A B C I) E as the 
constitutive elements of a conscious act, with C ns its 
substantive or focal part and tho relations A-C, IJ-C, A-B-C, 
C-ll, C-B, and C-D-ß as the transitive parts. The relation 
C-X is included in a vague way as one of the possible 
obscure relations contained in the fringe of C, but because 
1) and E were perceived as closely following C in the stream, 
the relation C-X is not included within the limits of tho 
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specious present (which has for its focal point C) because 
one of the terns of the relation (viz., X) is not an in-
cluded element in the act of awareness. As such, the 
relation C-X would not be recognized (or "thought", 
"cognized") as a relation (at least from the viewpoint of 
C) because of the failure to specify X as an actualized 
terminus of a relation with C. All but those few relations 
which are realized in the specious present remain simply 
possible cognized relations whose "time had not yet come": 
"the mass of our thinking," James remarks, "vanishes for-
ever, beyond hope of recovery."1o 
A "fringe" is thus an incomplete relation and is dis-
tinguished from transitive states by its incomplctcdness. 
A transitive state is always finalized as a definite part 
within the stream by the objects which arc the terminal 
points of the relation of which the transitive part is 
the cognition. But we must add that James refers to 
fringes also as "unnamed states" of consciousness which, 
as Ii. B, McGilvary points out, cognize such incomplete 
relations.17 Therefore, even though fringes are only 
vague feelings of tendency which may never become con-
sciously recognized as referring to any specified object, 
they still exercise the cognitivo function of giving 
vague indications of the possible direction of thought 
and must be included as actual parts of the stream of 
thought.IB 
If we are to relate fringes to the substantive and 
transitive parts of an act of consciousness, we would 
have to say that fringes originate in the substantive 
parts as the-possibilities which the substantive part 
has for being meaningful. As various fringes are deter-
mined and specified in transitive states (or, as they 
"become" transitive states), the substantive parts are 
recognized as gaining meaning becauso of the contexts in 
which they are found. The transitive states define the 
context, while the fringes define the possibilities for 
the realization of the transitive stetes« For this reason, 
to refer to the fringes as "marginal" is deceptive if we 
conclude from this type of language that fringes do not 
have much importance in terms of the stream of thought. 
For the fringes are necessary for the establishment of 
transitive parts, and transitive parts give meaning to 
the substantive parts by which the act as a whole is 
named. Thus, the fringes ore the ground for the naming 
of nn act of consciousness and for giving an act or 
thought its meaning; in themselves, though, fringes 
involve a minimum of meaning and specification. 
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Concluding Note 
In order to recognize the import or significance of 
many of ilusscri's and Wittgenstein's remarks on and uses 
of William .lames* writings, it is necessary to understand 
James 1 imngcs--frr example, of "field" and "stream"--as 
concepts opernti\e not only in his discussion of fringes 
and transitive slates hut also in the positions developed 
by Itusserl and Wittgenstein. Both Husscrl and 
Wittgenstein refer to these images-numerous times in 
contexts where James is also often referred to. Seldom, 
however, is an attempt made to show exactly what James* 
position was in regard to the use of these iraages--a 
position which apparently prompted the two later 
thinkers to find so much of interest in James. 
To a great extent, Ilusscri's continual concern 
for giving a phenomenological explication of the 
constitution of the ego highlights the fact that meaning-
tuiness in general (as it defines potential evidences 
as both real and logical--i,e., statically mcaningful--
possibillties for experience) arises out of and in the 
context of 'the actual syntheses of evidences which 
"constitute" the process or stream of consciousness. 
This awareness of the contribution to nicnningfulncss 
of "history"--understood not only in terms of the 
history of man (in human community and culture) but 
also in terms of the history of the individual cgo--
is a theme that links works of such different tonal 
characters as ilusscri's Cartesian Meditations mid 
the Crisis of r.uropcnn Sciences and Transcendental 
Phcnqroenqlogy. Fron» the Hesitations point of view, 
the field-stream contrast becomes recognized in the 
complementarity of the concern with essences (in 
Musscrl's oldos-cgo discussions) and the concern with 
the life of the transcendental ego as the center of 
horizons which continually appear as clarifying the 
real possibilities for modalitios of being and 
consciousness. The determination of the logical 
structure or categories of constitution which 
characterize the oidos-cp.o arc limited not only 
statically--i,c., in torns of the requirement that the 
constitution of all objectivities of possible 
consciousness be understood according to the copIto-
cpgitaturn schema--but also genetically--i.e., in terms 
of the fact that the factual dictates of coexistence 
and succession in time limits the compossibility of 
possible types of ego and possible types of experience. 
Prom the Crisis viewpoint, in on unmlstakoably 
Hegelian way, history Is seen to constitute rtonnlng-
fulness in expressing reasou itself--that is, reason 
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understood as ratio (meaning, "rationale"). Reason 
operates in history, for Uusscrl, because history 
defines cleaning; and on the individual's level, reason 
operates in the "history" or stream of consciousness 
which itself becomes the basis for the development of 
logic. Meaningfulness, in short, is rntio-nnlity. 
Throughout tho Philosophical Investigations and 
Zettel, Wittgenstein indicates that a proper description 
of the "meaning" of words should consist of (1) a 
recognition that the meaning of a word is grounded in 
the stream of experience and that "only in the stream 
of thought and life do words have meaning" (Z 173); 
and (2) a recognition that the elements of the stream 
can be singled out or temporarily considered apart 
from the stream in order further to understand the 
content of experience in terms of images of "fields" 
or "pictures." For both Wittgenstein and James (whose 
Principles of Psychology Wittgenstein oTtcn refers to), 
an important contrast develops between considering 
ideas in terms of a stream of thought and considering 
ideas in terms of a state or "field" of static relations. 
While James* prime concern is to show that the ideas we 
have have significance and value primarily iu terms of 
the stream of thought in which they appear, Wittgenstein 
is more concerned with the cleaning words have for us--
though ho does feel that Janes' point goes to the 
very heart of the discussion concerning the fact that 
words hove meaning in terms of their use within the 
stream of thought, life, and experience. 
For Wittgenstein, family resemblances hove meaning 
insofar as they arc considered as relationships of 
familiarity in streams of personal experience. Insofar 
as such streams overlap in coinciding "ways of life," 
the meanings of our words are psychologically grounded 
in such a way as to negate the possibility of 
meaningful private languages. What 1 nm suggesting 
is that the key to Wittgenstein's fartlly rcscmhlances 
argument might be found in understanding objects as 
related to ono another intentionally--that is, in terms 
of how they are in fact related as familiar iu a stream 
or streams of experience; this familiarity in the 
stream becomes the basis for ontologlcal claims and 
for Wittgenstein's Investigations, and Zettol descrip-
tions of the logical and pictorial (static or field) 
theories of meaning. The converse--that logical or 
pictorial theories of meaning act as the basis for 
weaning iu the stream of expcricnce--npparcntly is 
much less true of the later Wittgenstein than of the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractntus. In short, for the 
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later Wittgenstein, tho similarity of the terms 
"familiar" and "familial" is not simply coincidental; 
and 1 would suggest that the basis for this 
recognition lies in understanding James* discussion 
of objects of consciousness in the stream of thought. 
St. Louis University 
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